Jurisdictional Discovery Under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act
JosephM. Terryt
The United States has long afforded foreign sovereigns immunity from suit in its courts. As early as 1812, in The Schooner
Exchange v McFaddon,1 Chief Justice Marshall recognized the
concept of foreign sovereign immunity, explaining that it arose
from the "common interest impelling [sovereign states] to mutual
intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other."2
The importance of foreign sovereign immunity has kept pace
with the dramatic growth of international trade and the rise in
both the complexity and intensity of relations between nationstates. Today, U.S. corporations and citizens frequently transact
with a wide variety of foreign corporate entities: some fully private, some fully state-owned, and many others somewhere in the
middle-caught between post-socialist economic privatization and
lingering fears of free market competition.' When these transactions go awry the parties often seek to resolve their differences
through litigation. The availability of relief in such instances depends largely on whether or not the foreign entity is protected by
the law of sovereign immunity. Thus, the law of foreign sovereign
immunity plays a critical role for both U.S. citizens conducting
business with foreign entities and the foreign entities themselves.
Unfortunately, current formulations of U.S. foreign sovereign
immunity law provide neither the predictability to deal with
modern transnational disputes nor the protections needed to encourage foreign governments to do business with U.S. corporations and to abide by the rulings of U.S. courts.
The American law of foreign sovereign immunity is governed
by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), which codifies
both the principle of sovereign immunity and several exceptions
to immunity. 4 In determining the availability of sovereign immut B.A. 1996, Northwestern University; J.D. 1999, The University of Chicago.
11 US (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
Id at 137.
See The Banking Market, Warsaw Voice 1 (Aug 2, 1998) (discussing EC criticism of
large state involvement in Polish banks); Eugene M. Khartukov, Incomplete Privatization
Mixes Ownership ofRussia'sOil Industry, Oil & Gas J 36 (Aug 18, 1997).
4 28 USCA §§ 1602-11 (1994 & Supp 1998).
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nity under the FSIA, courts face two related difficulties. First, the
issue of immunity must be determined as a preliminary matter,
because federal jurisdiction5 over foreign sovereigns exists only
when there is a statutory exception to immunity.' Second, because of the ambiguity of the FSIA and the factual complexities of
many challenges to FSIA immunity, courts often must conduct
significant factfinding prior to determining immunity. Herein lies
the paradox. To determine whether the defendant is immune
from suit, the court must often permit some discovery. This preliminary discovery, however, may violate the immunity of the foreign sovereign. On the one hand, a strict limitation on discovery
may hinder the plaintiff's ability to pursue relief for the tortious
and commercial actions of a foreign sovereign. On the other hand,
because it is often "impossible to make a decision concerning
subject matter jurisdiction without considering the merits'" of the
case, a permissive discovery rule may result in significant encroachments on foreign states' sovereignty, rendering the protections of the FSIA meaningless and undermining international
comity.
American courts have yet to address this dilemma adequately. Typically, courts offer the vague prescription that discovery in these circumstances must be "limited."8 But courts
rarely explain how to conduct or manage limited discovery to determine jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. Presently, only the
Fifth, Second, and D.C. Circuits have articulated standards that
extend beyond the simple admonition that any discovery must be
limited.9 And while these courts have articulated nominally different standards for discovery, each of them fails to afford foreign
sovereigns the protections promised by the FSIA.
This Comment analyzes the importance of sovereign immunity, the difficulties faced by a plaintiff litigating against a foreign sovereign, and the difficulties faced by a U.S. court in evalu' The FSIA grants jurisdiction to federal and state courts. See Notes of Decision to 28
USCA § 1605, citing Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co v Continental Gas Co, 814 F Supp 1302,
1308-09 (M D La 1993) (stating that the FSIA does not require that foreign sovereigns be
sued in federal courts).
' See, for example, 28 USCA § 1605; Phaneuf v Republic of Indonesia, 106 F3d 302,
305 (9th Cir 1997) ("Subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA [ I must be decided before
the suit can proceed."); Coleman v Alcolac, Inc, 888 F Supp 1388, 1400 (S D Tex 1995) ("At
the outset of every action in a district court against a foreign state, it is of crucial importance for the court to satisfy itself that one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity applies.").
' FirstFidelity Bank NA v Government of Antigua & Barbuda-PermanentMission,
877 F2d 189, 196 (2d Cir 1989).
See, for example, Filus v Lot PolishAirlines, 907 F2d 1328, 1332 (2d Cir 1990).
See Part Ill.
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ating challenges to foreign sovereign immunity. Part I describes
the FSIA. Part II discusses the competing interests at stake in jurisdictional determinations under the statute. Part III examines
the approaches to discovery currently used by courts and identifies some of the deficiencies of these approaches. As an alternative to current formulations, Part IV suggests that courts should
permit limited jurisdictional discovery against a foreign sovereign
only where the plaintiff (1) produces some evidence of a basis for
jurisdiction and (2) demonstrates that discovery is reasonably
likely to uncover evidence that will support a finding of jurisdiction beyond a preponderance of the evidence. This approach will
allow plaintiffs to pursue discovery where discovery is likely to
uncover facts sufficient to uphold jurisdiction, but it will avoid
the burdensome "fishing expeditions" that result from more lenient rules.
I.

THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT

Enacted in 1976, the FSIA provides the "sole and exclusive
standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised by foreign states before Federal and State courts in
the United States."" Although it enacted significant procedural
changes," the FSIA left much of the substantive law of foreign
sovereign immunity unchanged, codifying the "restrictive" view of
foreign sovereign immunity that has guided U.S. decisionmaking
since 1952.12
Recognizing the expanding role of foreign states in international commerce, the restrictive view affords immunity only for
the public acts of a sovereign and denies it for purely commercial
"0Jurisdiction of Courts in Suits Against Foreign States, HR Rep No 94-1487, 94th
Cong, 2d Sess 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 USCCAN 6604, 6610. See also 28 USCA § 1602
("Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the
United States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter").
, See text accompanying notes 18-26.
12 Prior to 1952, the United States followed the classical or "absolute" view of sovereign immunity, which held that any act of a foreign sovereign must be treated with complete immunity. See, for example, The Schooner Exchange, 11 US (7 Cranch) at 137. The
United States abandoned this broad view of immunity in 1952 in the wake of a State Department letter known as the "Tate Letter." See Letter from the Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to the Attorney General, Department of Justice, May 19, 1952 ("Tate
Letter"), published in 26 Dept State Bull 984, 984 (1952) (discussing the Department of
State's reasons for concluding that sovereign immunity "should no longer be granted in
certain types of cases"); Gary B. Born, InternationalCivil Litigation in United States
Courts 202 (Kluwer Law Intl 3d ed 1996). The U.S. adopted the restrictive view, at least in
part, in order to bring its immunity practices in line with those of its trading partners,
most of whom had already adopted the restrictive view. Tate Letter, 26 Dept State Bull at
984-85.
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acts. 3 The FSIA codifies this modern theory, qualifying its broad
grant of immunity with several exceptions. The FSIA's general
immunity provision states that "a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States," 4 subject to a number of exceptions. 5 The most significant
exception" denies immunity to a foreign state in general where
the action is based upon a commercial activity that bares a connection to the United States.'7
Although the FSIA did little to alter the U.S. law of foreign
sovereign immunity conceptually, it introduced two important
and related changes to the legal decisionmaking process. First,
the FSIA sought to establish firm statutory standards for determinations of sovereign immunity. 8 Prior to the FSIA, foreign
sovereign immunity decisions were made on an ad hoc political
basis that offered little predictability to parties hoping to assert
or defeat the defense. 9 Congress expressed concern that "[a] private party who deals with a foreign government entity cannot be
certain that his legal dispute with a foreign state will not be decided on the basis of nonlegal considerations through the foreign
government's intercession with the Department of State."'
14

See Tate Letter, 26 Dept State Bull at 984-85 (cited in note 12).
28 USCA § 1604.

,In addition to the "commercial activities exception," id § 1605(aX2), the FSIA withdraws immunity in any case in which the foreign state waives its immunity, id
§ 1605(aX1); in any case in which the plaintiff alleges the taking of commercial property in
violation of international law or the taking of inunovable property located in the United
States, id § 1605(a)(3)-(4); in any case in which "money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to... property, occurring in the United
States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state," id § 1605(a)(5); and
in cases alleging personal injury based on a foreign nation's role in torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking where the foreign nation defendant is designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, id § 1605(aX7).
" See Republic of Argentina v Weltover, Inc, 504 US 607, 611 (1992) (describing the
commercial activity exception as "[tlhe most significant of the FSIA's exceptions").
1728 USCA § 1605(a)(2) (denying immunity where "the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States).
" See 28 USCA §§ 1603, 1605 (defining "foreign state" and "commercial activity" and
codifying exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity). See also HR Rep No 94-1487 at 1, 6,
reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6604 (cited in note 10) (explaining that the primary purpose of the act was to provide firm standards for foreign defendants seeking to assert the
defense of sovereign immunity).
" See HR Rep No 94-1487 at 7, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6605 (cited in note 10)
(In enacting the legislation, Congress noted that, "[ait present, there are no comprehensive provisions in our law available to inform parties when they can have recourse to the
courts to assert a legal claim against a foreign state.").
"Id at 9, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6607.
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Second, the FSIA transferred sovereign immunity decisionmaking power from the State Department to the courts. Although
nominally vested with the power to determine sovereign immunity prior to 1976,21 courts made no independent determinations
of immunity, deferring instead to the State Department's Office
of the Legal Adviser, which held quasi-judicial hearings on immunity.22 By transferring the power to make sovereign immunity
decisions from the State Department to the judiciary, Congress
sought to encourage the development of a consistent and predictable body of law. Prior to the adoption of the FSIA, the State Department was in the "awkward position of a political institution
trying to apply a legal standard to litigation already before the
courts." The result was "considerable uncertainty" for both private parties and foreign states.24 Transferring power to the courts
substantially depoliticized sovereign immunity decisionnaking.
Congress hoped that by allowing the courts to make independent
determinations of immunity, "[tlhe Department of State would be
freed from pressures from foreign governments ...

and from any

adverse consequences resulting from an unwillingness of the Department to support that immunity."26 While the FSIA succeeded
to a large degree in depoliticizing the process, even judicial determinations of immunity can engender political and economic
repercussions, as will be discussed in Parts H and III.
II. THE CHALLENGE IN TME WAKE OF THE FSIA

Although the FSIA facilitated the development of a more coherent doctrine of immunity, it presented courts with a new
challenge: How to resolve often complex and fact-intensive claims
of foreign sovereign immunity without impinging on the very interests that immunity seeks to protect. Unable to rely on State

21

In 1943, the Supreme Court held that these recommendations "must be accepted by

the courts as a conclusive determination by the political arm of the Government." Ex Parte
Republic ofPeru, 318 US 578, 589 (1943).
For a description of this process see Daniel G. Partan, The InternationalLaw Process 735 (Carolina Academic 1992), citing John A. Boyd, Digest of US Practice in InternationalLaw 1977 1018-19 (Dept of State Pub No 8960 (1979)).
HR Rep No 94-1487 at 8, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6607 (cited in note 10).
24 Id at 9, reprinted in 1976 USCOAN at 6607; Born, InternationalCivil Litigation at
211 (cited in note 12).
See Partan, The InternationalLaw Processat 735 (cited in note 22). For an example
of the politicization of immunity determinations, see Rich v Naviera Vacuba, SA, 295 F2d
24 (4th Cir 1961) (per curiam) (accepting the State Department's grant of immunity in a
clearly commercial case in order to facilitate the release of a hijacked airplane).
HR Rep No 94-1487 at 7, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6606 (cited in note 10).
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Department assessments, courts are now forced to develop their
own means of assessing claims of sovereign immunity.
Two related problems complicate this new task. First, the
FSIA has transformed the defense of sovereign immunity into a
preliminary matter of jurisdiction, effectively forcing resolution of
this complex issue at the earliest possible moment in litigation.'
Unlike State Department recommendations, judicial determinations of immunity require a preliminary exercise of jurisdictionjurisdiction to determine jurisdiction-that necessarily encroaches, at least minimally, upon sovereign immunity." Second,
the FSIA provides courts little guidance in navigating the complex legal and factual terrain of sovereign immunity." As a result, courts must often conduct significant factfimding before determining immunity.
A. The Pressure for Early Adjudication
In general, district courts must determine jurisdictional issues at the outset of litigation."0 When the parties contest issues
of jurisdiction, courts typically exercise their broad discretion to
conduct preliminary jurisdictional discovery." Occasionally, when
unable to determine jurisdiction at the outset, courts will permit
litigation to advance as far as the trial stage until sufficient evidence surfaces to resolve jurisdictional disputes.3 2
In the context of foreign sovereign immunity, however, the
balance of interests is dramatically realigned. Unlike normal jurisdictional inquiries, inquiries under the FSIA necessarily implicate sovereign interests and often the inquiries themselves may
impermissibly intrude upon immunity. Because "sovereign im-

28 USCA § 1604. See also 28 USCA § 1330(a) (1993 & Supp 1998).
The very exercise of jurisdiction, the hauling into court of the plaintiff, intrudes at
least minimally upon the foreign sovereign's right to be free from the entire legal process.
As the process intensifies from service of process to discovery to trial and judgment, the
intrusion upon the sovereign's interests necessarily increases as well.
See Stena Rederi AB v Comision de Contratosdel Comite, 923 F2d 380, 385 (5th Cir
1991) ("The operative provisions of the FSIA are deliberately vague-leaving the courts to
grasp for creative solutions to sticky questions of sovereign rights.").
See Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, 5A FederalPracticeand Procedure:
Civil 2d § 1350 at 209-10 (West 1990 & Supp 1998) (stating that courts should consider a
jurisdiction-based motion to dismiss before any other motions, defenses, or objections).
See OppenheimerFund, Inc o Sanders, 437 US 340, 351 n 13 (1978) (stating that
"where issues arise as to jurisdiction or venue, discovery is available to ascertain the facts
bearing on such issues").
"See Wright and Miller, 5A FederalPractice § 1350 at 237-38 n 57 (cited in note 30)
(stating that if a jurisdictional issue is interwoven with the merits of the case, the district
court may postpone resolution until trial); 63B Am Jur 2d Products Liability § 1649 at 203
(1996) (same).
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munity is immunity from suit, not just from liability,' courts
have consistently held that issues of immunity must be resolved
at the very outset of litigation.' Consequently, in cases involving
foreign sovereigns, courts have been forced to abandon traditional
methods of jurisdictional factfmding in favor of more restrictive
alternatives.'
B. The Complexities of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
The normal difficulties posed by resolving jurisdictional issues at an early stage in litigation are exacerbated by the complexity and fact-intensive nature of claims of sovereign immunity.
Courts and commentators have frequently decried the FSIA for
its lack of definitional clarity." Significantly, the Act fails to define "commercial activities" clearly, despite widespread recognition that "[t]he determination of whether particular behavior is
'commercial' is perhaps the most important decision a court faces
in an FSIA suit."7 In the past, courts facing challenges to sovereign immunity have struggled over such difficult questions as
whether an Iranian bank nationalized in the wake of the Islamic
Revolution qualified as a "central bank"; whether state exploitation of natural resources constituted a commercial or public act;'9
and whether socialist state entities, such as a Yugoslavian workers' organization 0 or a Soviet press agency," should be considered
Gould,Inc v Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F2d 445, 451 (6th Cir 1988).
See note 6 and accompanying text.
See Part III.B.
See, for example, Gibbons v Udarasna Gaeltachta, 549 F Supp 1094, 1105 (S D NY
1982) (describing the FSIA.as a "labyrinth that, owing to the numerous interpretive questions engendered by its bizarre structure and its many deliberately vague provisions, has
during its brief lifetime been a financial boon for the private bar but a constant bane of the
federal judiciary"); Jeffrey Jacobson, Trying to Fit a Square Peg into a Round Hole: The
ForeignSovereign Immunities Act and Human Rights Violations, 19 Whittier L Rev 757,
777 (noting that the FSIA is "fraught with vague language and confi2sing intent").
' Texas Trading & Milling Corp v FederalRepublic of Nigeria, 647 F2d 300, 308 (2d
Cir 1981).
3
New EnglandMerchantsNational Bank v IranPower Generationand Transmission
Co, 502 F Supp 120 (S D NY 1980). For a general discussion of the liability of central
banks under the FSIA and attendant proof problems, see Bruce W. Nichols, The Impact of
the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act on the Enforcement of Lenders' Remedies, 1982 U Ill
L Rev 251, 272-83.
' MatterofSedco, Inc, 543 F Supp 561, 564-66 (S D Tex 1982) (finding that drilling an
exploratory well was not a commercial activity because "[a] very basic attribute of sovereignty is the control over its mineral resources and short of actually selling these resources on the world market, decisions and conduct concerning them are uniquely governmental in nature").
Edlow InternationalCo v Nuklearna ElektrarnaKrsko, 441 F Supp 827, 831-32 (D
DC 1977) (noting the difficulties in applying normal standards of government ownership
in determining the immunity of socialist entities).
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"agencies or instrumentalities" of a foreign state and therefore
immune from suit under the FSIA. Recently, the D.C. Circuit confronted and rejected the novel claim that Iranian state-sponsored
terrorism (kidnapping) constituted a commercial act where the
kidnapping was expressly designed to force the United States to
release millions of dollars in frozen Iranian assets.42
Attempts by plaintiffs to prove an FSIA exception through
the presence of complex alter-ego relationships43 compound the
difficulty of resolving questions of sovereign immunity. In most
areas of litigation, plaintiffs rely upon alter-ego relationships in
order to impute substantive liability; in the FSIA context, however, a demonstration of such a relationship can lead to a determination of immunity that often proves critical to even preliminary findings of jurisdiction." Furthermore, these relationships
are often highly complex and typically require significant factual
determinations. For example, in HesterInternationalCorp v Federal Republic of Nigeria,45 the Fifth Circuit considered a complex
challenge to sovereign immunity based upon Nigeria's alleged alter-ego relationship with a state-created agricultural corporation.
In finding no alter-ego relationship, the court probed a series of
difficult factual matters: the extent to which the Nigerian government participated in the day-to-day operations of the corporation; the extent to which the corporation secretly represented the
government; and whether any Nigerian government employees
participated in the corporation's dealings.46
Additionally, questions of jurisdiction are often inextricably
intertwined with questions of substance, making it nearly impossible to limit discovery to purely jurisdictional questions.47 For
41

Yessenin-Volpin v Novosti PressAgency, 443 F Supp 849, 852 (S D NY 1978) (noting

that the FSIA's definitions of "agency" and "instrumentality" are "ill-suited to concepts
which exist in socialist states such as the Soviet Union").
Cicippio v IslamicRepublic of Iran, 30 F3d 164 (DC Cir 1994).
An alter-ego relationship is one in which "a corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created." First National
City Bank v Banco Parael Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 US 611, 629 (1983).
See, for example, First City, Texas-Houston v Rafidain Bank, 150 F3d 172, 176-77
(2d Cir 1998) (granting discovery where plaintiff alleged alter-ego relationship between
defendant and the Iraqi central bank); Dames & Moore v Emirate of Dubai, 1996 US Dist
LEXES 17030, *9 (N D Cal) (explaining that the court "cannot assert subject matter jurisdiction over the Emirate of Dubai for the acts of the Dubai Municipality absent a factual
finding that an agency relationship exists between the two").
879 F2d 170 (5th Cir 1989).
Id at 179-81.
4,See Jungquistv Sheikh Sultan Bin Ekalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F3d 1020, 1027-28 (DC
Cir 1997) (noting that courts must engage in substantial factual determinations when
faced with a challenge to FSIA immunity); FirstFidelity Bank v Government ofAntigua &
Barbuda-PermanentMission, 877 F2d 189, 194-96 (2d Cir 1989) (holding that proof of
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example, First Fidelity Bank v Government of Antigua & Barbuda-PermanentMission," involved a suit against the government of Antigua & Barbuda for repayment of a bank note provided to an ambassador, allegedly under governmental authority.
Antigua argued that although the loan constituted a commercial
activity, it was not bound by the ambassador's actions since he
acted without state authority in borrowing the money. 9 If the
ambassador acted without authority, Antigua had not engaged in
a commercial act and the court could not assert jurisdiction under
the FSIA.' Because the question of whether Antigua was bound
by the loan constituted a necessary element of jurisdiction as well
as support for First Fidelity's substantive claim, any determination of jurisdiction would require inquiry into the merits of the
case.

51

In some instances, to assert jurisdiction under the FSIA,
plaintiffs must proffer evidence identical to that needed to prove
52
the substantive claim. For example, in Greenpeace, Inc v France,
the plaintiffs' attempts to prove a noncommercial tort exception
to immunity' depended entirely on their ability to prove their
substantive claim-that they were victims of the noncommercial
tort. Proof of a substantive claim served as a prerequisite for jurisdiction.
C. Competing Interests
Courts must design discovery rules that will not only overcome these significant factfinding difficulties but will also strike a
tenable balance between the plaintiffs need for discovery and the
foreign sovereign's need for protection from litigation. On the one
hand, excessively stringent discovery rules will deprive plaintiffs
of opportunities to redress the wrongs of foreign state actors, effectively eliminating the exceptions to foreign sovereign immuapparent authority was essential to both a finding of jurisdiction and a decision on the
merits); CorporacionVenezolana de Fomento v Vintero Sales Corp, 629 F2d 786, 790-91 n
4 (2d Cir 1980) (finding that "[i]n many cases a resolution of the substantive immunity law
issues will be required in order to reach a decision on subject matter jurisdiction"); Upton
v Empire of Iran, 459 F Supp 264, 265 (D DC 1978) (noting that the FSIA "creates an
identity of substance and procedure").
a 877 F2d 189 (2d Cir 1989).
4 Id at 191.
Id at 195-96.
" The court granted discovery to resolve jurisdictional issues even though they were
"interwoven with the merits." Id at 196.
946 F Supp 773 (C D Cal 1996) (plaintiff environmentalists alleged that Air France
employees "physically struck" and unlawfully detained them during layover in the United
States).
"28 USCA § 1605(aX5).
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nity and fistrating the FSIA's policy of holding foreign sovereigns accountable for certain activities. On the other hand, liberal
discovery rules may eviscerate foreign sovereigns' immunity from
suit, undermining international comity' and the legitimacy of
U.S. courts in the international arena.
1.

The defendant's need for protection from discovery.

American courts have traditionally treated the concept of
sovereign immunity as "a matter of grace and comity" -a recognition of the common interests of nations-rather than as a constitutional command.5 6 As the international community began to
abandon the classical doctrine of absolute immunity in favor of a
more restrictive doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, the
United States followed suit.57 However, with the enactment of the
FSIA and the concomitant shift in decisionmaking authority from
the executive branch to the judiciary,' foreign states became
subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts and broad pretrial discovery practices. In struggling to define appropriate limits for jurisdictional discovery against foreign sovereigns, courts have
noted two primary concerns. First, because even jurisdictional
discovery is likely to be broad and highly intrusive when conducted against foreign sovereigns, the FSIA must provide foreign
states with "not merely a defense to liability, but immunity from
the burdens of litigation as well."59 Second, overly permissive discovery rules are likely to engender international hostility and
may undermine both 'judicial comity among nations"' and international confidence in the U.S. judicial system.
a) Sovereign immunity provides complete protection from litigation. The law of foreign sovereign immunity is designed not
only to protect foreign government agencies and officers from adverse judgments but also "to promote the functioning of all governments by protecting a state from the burden of defending law
suits abroad which are based on its public acts."6 Indeed, courts
" International comity is, at its heart, a doctrine of reciprocity. It is a reflection of 'the
systemic value of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill." Socidt6 Nationale IndustrielleAdrospatiale v United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 482 US 522, 555
(1987) (Blackmun concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Verlinden BV v CentralBank ofNigeria, 461 US 480, 486 (1983).
Id.
See note 12 and accompanying text.
See text accompanying notes 21-26.
Gabay v Mostazafan FoundationofIran, 151 FRD 250, 256 (S D NY 1993).
Arriba,Ltd vPetroleosMexicanos, 962 F2d 528, 537 (5th Cir 1992).
SI Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1975, Hearings on HR 11315 before the House
Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 27
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frequently analogize FSIA immunity to the "qualified immunity 2
that largely shields U.S. government officials from discovery and
liability in cases alleging civil damages resulting from their good
faith performance of discretionary duties." To be meaningful, the
law of foreign sovereign immunity must protect foreign sovereigns, as qualified immunity protects U.S. officials, from all aspects of the litigation process, including the "broad-ranging discovery' that can be 'peculiarly disruptive of effective government."" Moreover, courts have long recognized that the doctrine
of foreign sovereign immunity is rooted in a respect for the dignity of sovereign states and the judgment that the United States
should not diminish this dignity by forcing the foreign sovereign
to appear before a U.S. court." Thus, even an initial exercise of
jurisdiction undermines one of the principles behind sovereign
immunity.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has warned lower courts to
"exercise special vigilance" to protect all foreign litigants from the
burdens of discovery." The Court has noted that "the additional
cost of transportation of documents or witnesses to or from foreign locations may increase the danger that discovery may be
sought for the improper purpose of motivating settlement, rather
than finding relevant and probative evidence. "
Because issues of jurisdiction and substance are often tightly
interwoven in cases against foreign sovereigns," any jurisdictional discovery is likely to be both wide-ranging and intrusive.
Determinations of FSIA jurisdiction often require discovery on
foreign soil and inquiry into the domestic affairs of foreign nations, probing into sensitive political and economic issues.69
(1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, State Dept Legal Advisor).
" See, for example, Segni v Commercial Office of Spain, 816 F2d 344, 347 (7th Cir
1987); Arriba, 962 F2d at 534.
' Qualified immunity protects government officials only "insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Crawford-El v Britton, 523 US 574, 118 S Ct 1584, 1592 (1998).
For a thorough discussion of qualified immunity, see Mary Massaron Ross, ed, Sword &
Shield Revisited:A PracticalApproach to Section 1983 (ABA 1998).
"Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635, 646 n 6 (1987) (discussing qualified immunity),
quoting Harlow v Fitzgerald,457 US 800, 817 (1982).
See The Schooner Exchange, 11 US (7 Cranch) at 136.
Socigt6NationaleIndustrielleAdrospatiale,482 US at 546.
Id.
See Part H.B.
See for example, In re Papandreou,139 F3d 247, 252 (DC Cir 1998) (State Department intervened on behalf of Greece due to "sensitive diplomatic considerations involved."); Arriba, 962 F2d at 536 n 15 (Defendant requested many documents pertaining
to the relationship between the Mexican national oil supplier and private corporations, including documents referring to internal investigations of "any alleged misconduct, in-
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Challenges to sovereign immunity are often predicated upon
proof of alter-ego relationships and, as a result, discovery requests will often touch on sensitive matters of political corrup-

tion,70 relationships between central governments and industrial
organizations, 7 and relationships between foreign governments
and terrorist organizations. 2 Indeed, as privatization flourishes
and American corporations begin to bring suits against the newly
privatized corporations of China and the former Soviet Union,
discovery requests will increasingly encroach upon sensitive is-

sues of industrial relations, corruption, and political influence.'
b) Comity among nations.While the United States' treatment
of foreign sovereign immunity bears a striking resemblance to
that of the international community, American discovery practices stand alone. As the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations explains, "No aspect of the extension of the American legal
system beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has
given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents in investigation and litigation in the United States. " 4
Even greater friction can be expected when American plaintiffs demand that foreign sovereigns produce governmental matecluding bribery, extortion, ultra vires acts, tax evasion, embezzlement and any other possible violations of U.S. or Mexican law.'); Crist v Republic of Turkey, 995 F Supp 5, 6-7 (D
DC 1998) (Plaintiffs requested discovery regarding Turkish treatment of Greek nationals
living on Cyprus.).
,*See Phaneufv Republic of Indonesia, 106 F3d 302, 307 (9th Cir 1997) (examining
the authority of an Indonesian defense agency to authorize promissory notes); Arriba, 962
F2d at 530-32, 534, 536 n 15 (alleging corrupt relationship between Mexican national oil
company and private oil corporations).
" See Rafidain Bank, 150 F3d at 174 (alleging alter-ego relationship between Iraqi
central bank and purportedly private Iraqi bank); Arriba, 962 F2d at 530-32.
See Cicippio, 30 F3d at 168 (alleging that the Islamic Republic of Iran was responsible for the kidnapping of American hostages and that such action constituted a commercial activity since hostages were held in order to persuade the U.S. to release frozen Iranian assets).
" See, for example, Reinsurance Co ofAmerica v AdministratiaAsigurarilorde Stat,
902 F2d 1275, 1278-81 (7th Cir 1990) (seeking discovery of information made newly available after the fall of Romania's communist regime); Richmark Corp v Timber FallingConsultants, 959 F2d 1468, 1474-79 (9th Cir 1992) (sanctioning corporation of the People's
Republic of China for failing to respond to discovery requests aimed at ascertaining the
corporation's worldwide assets on the grounds of state secrecy).
' Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 442, Rep
Note 1 at 354 (ALI 1987). See also Environmental Tectonics v W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc, 847
F2d 1052, 1062 n 11 (3d Cir 1988) ("Foreign governments have often expressed their dissatisfaction with the wide discovery authorized under the Federal Rules, finding it intrusive and overbroad when compared to the European version of the fact-finding process.").
As one scholar noted, "Foreign governments assert their sovereign right to control documents, witnesses, and other evidence located within their territory and characterize unilateral U.S. efforts to compel the production of such evidence in U.S. proceedings as infringements on their sovereign prerogatives and territorial integrity." Born, International
Civil Litigation at 850 (cited in note 12).
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rials prior to even a preliminary determination of jurisdiction.
Permissive discovery rules in the context of foreign sovereign
immunity are likely not only to exacerbate the international
trend toward blocking statutes7 5 but may also "undermine the
State Department's continuing efforts to encourage . . . foreign
sovereigns generally [ ] to resolve disputes within the United
States' legal framework."76 Furthermore, by failing to give full respect to international comity, particularly where sensitive economic and political issues are concerned, U.S. courts risk harm-

ing America's diplomatic relations with foreign states." Finally,
permissive discovery rules may encourage foreign states to modify their own immunity laws in a manner hostile to U.S. interests.7" As Justice Blackmun explained in a related context, 'The
United States is increasingly concerned... with protecting sensitive technology for both economic and military reasons. It may
not serve the country's long-term interest to establish precedents
that could allow foreign courts to compel production of the records
of American corporations. "

" In the last twenty years, hostility towards U.S. discovery practices has led a number
of foreign states to erect "blocking statutes" designed to stymie the reach of American judicial discovery orders. These statutes typically prohibit citizens from complying with U.S.
discovery orders demanding the production of evidence located within a foreign state's territory. See, for example, French Penal Code Law No 80-538, Arts la & 2, in Bulletin L&gislatif 285 (Dalloz 1980), translated in Born, International Civil Litigation at 853-54
(cited in note 12) ("[Ilt is prohibited for any person ... to request, to investigate or to disclose.., economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical matters leading to the
constitution of evidence with a view to foreign judicial or administrative proceedings.").
Approximately fifteen foreign nations have enacted similar statutes. See Born, InternationalCivil Litigation at 850-52.
"' Foremost-McKesson, Inc v IslamicRepublic ofIran, 905 F2d 438, 445 (DC Cir 1990),
quoting PracticalConcepts, Inc v Republic of Bolivia, 811 F2d 1543, 1551 n 19 (DC Cir
1987).
has become inSee Arriba, 962 F2d at 537 ("Judicial comity among nations ...
creasingly important to today's global economy. Flouting comity, Arriba's JFK-like
charges against the defendants, if pursued in American courts, could seriously impede our
relations with Mexico.") (footnote omitted). See also Papandreou, 139 F3d at 252 (State
Department intervened as amicus for Greece, noting the "sensitive diplomatic considerations" involved in the case.).
, For example, the State Department opposed the 1996 amendments to the FSIA,
which retracted immunity in cases of torture and extrajudicial killing. As one Representative argued, "The risk to American assets abroad would be significant should other countries respond.., by enacting further exceptions to their foreign sovereign immunity laws
which are broader in scope that [sic) is [this amendment]." Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Amendments, HR Rep No 103-702, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 12 (1994) (dissenting views of Rep
McCollum).
" Soci&t6Nationale IndustrielleAgrospatiale,482 US at 552 n 3 (Blackmun concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (discussing U.S. discovery practice in the context of the
Hague Convention).
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The plaintiff's need for discovery.

Despite foreign sovereigns' legitimate interests in avoiding
intrusive and burdensome discovery, plaintiffs' interests in conducting adequate discovery remain strong." Indeed, two factors
converge to make discovery particularly important in the context
of foreign sovereign immunity determinations: the location of jurisdictional evidence and the high evidentiary burden that the
FSIA places on the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction.
a) Location of the evidence. Plaintiffs are often unable to
prove an exception to the FSIA without significant discovery."s
Proof of an exception to immunity is highly fact dependent8 2 and
may require evidence that is in the exclusive possession of defendants."
Determinations of foreign sovereign immunity frequently entail inquiry into the inner workings and political structures of
foreign states.' For example, courts have required plaintiffs to
demonstrate that agents of the Indonesian National Defense Security Council were authorized to issue promissory notes;' that
the commercial activities of an Iranian charitable foundation located in New York could be attributed to the Iranian government; and that agents of the Soviet Union participated in the
service and maintenance of Soviet aircraft used by the Polish national airline.8 7 Absent discovery, plaintiffs are unlikely to have
access to such information, since often it is not available in the
public sphere. Without adequate discovery, courts will be forced
to rely upon foreign states' categorical denials of liability (and as" See Millicom International Cellular, SA v Republic of Costa Rica, 1997 US Dist
LEXS 12622, *4 (D DC) ("[P]laintiffs do, in fact, have a right to conduct preliminary discovery in such cases if it is directed towards resolving the issue of whether FSIA immunity
applies.").
" See, for example, Gabay, 151 FRD at 255-57 (Plaintiff's only evidence ofjurisdiction
was inadmissible as hearsay, but it served to demonstrate that discovery would uncover
admissible evidence of jurisdiction.); Millicom, 1997 US Dist LEXIS 12622 at *23 (Plaintiffs argued that "only discovery can determine the full extent of the defendants' operations in, and contacts with, the United States.").
See Part II.B.
See generally Note, The Use of Discovery to Obtain JurisdictionalFacts, 59 Va L
Rev 533, 541 (1973) ("Frequently the facts necessary to resolve the jurisdiction issue are
solely within the defendant's knowledge.").
This is particularly likely where the plaintiff's jurisdictional theory relies on an alter-ego relationship between a foreign state and a corporation. See text accompanying
notes 43-46.
Phaneuf,106 F3d at 307.
Gabay, 151 FRD at 257-58.
Filus v Lot PolishAirlines, 907 F2d 1328, 1333 (2d Cir 1990) (granting plaintiffs requests for interrogatories as to who designed the engines of the Soviet plane, who manufactured the plane, who assembled the plane, who serviced the plane, etc.).
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sertions of immunity), leaving plaintiffs without recourse. Because strict limitations on discovery will force plaintiffs to rely

exclusively on public information, discovery limitations may
benefit politically repressive states that strictly control access to
such information.
b) Plaintiffs evidentiary burden. Although the text of the
FSIA is silent as to burdens of-proof of immunity, both the legislative history and subsequent judicial interpretation of the Act
have placed a high evidentiary burden on plaintiffs. The House
Report explained that, although the foreign sovereign must produce prima facie evidence of immunity, "the burden of going forward would shift to the plaintiff to produce evidence establishing
that the foreign state is not entitled to immunity."' Courts have
further heightened the evidentiary burden by requiring plaintiffs
to overcome a presumption that the instrumentalities and agencies of a foreign sovereign are independent actors. 9 Because exceptions to sovereign immunity frequently turn on the strength of
the relationship between a foreign state and its instrumentalities," this presumption presents a substantial hurdle in the path
of any plaintiff
seeking to overcome a defense of foreign sovereign
91

immunity.
EI.

THE COURTS' ENIGMATIC ANSWER-LIMITED DIscovERY

In balancing these competing interests, courts uniformly recognize that discovery must be limited to the facts necessary to determine immunity.92 Despite the broad acceptance of limited disIHR Rep No 94-1487 at 17, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6616 (cited in note 10).
See First National City Bank, 462 US at 629 (explaining that this presumption of
independence can be overcome by a showing that the "entity is so extensively controlled by
its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created"). See also ForemostMcKesson, 905 F2d at 446 ("The presumption of the juridicial separateness of entities also
applies to jurisdictional issues."); Hester, 879 F2d at 176 (explaining that plaintiff "bears
the burden ofproving the agency relationship' at trial).
' See Foremost-McKesson, 905 F2d at 446-47 (remanding to the district court for factual determination of sufficient control by the defendant over its instrumentality "to create a relationship of principal to agent!). See also Gilson v Republic of Ireland, 682 F2d
1022, 1026 n 16, 1029-30 (DC Cir 1982) (finding that jurisdiction may hinge on "whether
the required agency existed").
" See, for example, Foremost-McKesson, 905 F2d at 447 (stating that "absent an
agency relationship, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign state for
the acts of its instrumentality"); Hester, 879 F2d at 176-77 (attempting to establish jurisdiction, plaintiff sought to prove exception to the FSIA on the basis of an alter-ego relationship between Nigeria and the National Grain Production Company).
"See, for example, First City, Texas-Houston v Rafidain Bank, 150 F3d 172, 176-77
(2d Cir 1998); Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp v Bank of China, 142 F3d 887, 896 n 13
(5th Cir 1998); In re Papandreou, 139 F3d 247, 252-54 (DC Cir 1998); Gould, Inc v
Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F2d 445, 451 (6th Cir 1988); Greenpeace, 946 F Supp at
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covery, the concept remains largely undeveloped. Few courts have
adopted a systematic approach to limiting jurisdictional discovery
in FSIA cases. Those courts that have dealt specifically with the
question have created a variety of requirements for plaintiffs
seeking discovery. Every court to address the issue explicitly has
advocated some form of heightened jurisdictional pleading. This
Comment will analyze both (1) traditional rules of jurisdictional
discovery and (2) the current forms of heightened pleading in the
FSIA context. This Comment argues that these approaches are
unpredictable and inadequately protect the immunity of foreign
sovereign entities. 3
A.

The Traditional Permissive Approach

In most contexts, district courts enjoy broad discretion to determine the scope of their jurisdiction. When jurisdiction is challenged, traditional practices afford a district court vast discretion
to define the contours of jurisdictional discovery." This discretion
extends to both the initial decision to permit jurisdictional discovery and to later decisions regarding the scope of that discov95
ery.
Accordingly, outside the context of FSIA claims, courts usually will permit jurisdictional discovery whenever "pertinent facts
bearing on the questions of jurisdiction are controverted, or [ ] a
more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary." In contrast,
courts typically deny discovery where plaintiffs have had ample
opportunity to conduct discovery yet failed to do so' or "when it is
clear that further discovery would not demonstrate facts sufficient to constitute a basis for jurisdiction."

789.
"These two categories, while analytically useful, do not reflect any clear cut circuit
split. It is perhaps a measure of the underdevelopment of this area of law that courts have
neither identified nor addressed the differences between the analytical approaches.
See Wells Fargo & Co v Wells FargoExpress Co, 556 F2d 406, 430-31 n 24 (9th Cir
1977) (describing jurisdictional discovery as "generally left to the discretion of the trial
court").
" See Naartex Consulting Corp v Watt, 722 F2d 779, 788 (DC Cir 1983) ("(A] district
court has broad discretion in its resolution of discovery problems that arise in cases
pending before it."), quoting In re Multi-Piece Rim ProductsLiability Litigation, 653 F2d
671, 679 (DC Cir 1981); Wells Fargo, 556 F2d at 430-31 n 24 ("An appellate court will not
interfere with the trial court's refusal to grant [jurisdictional] discovery except upon the
clearest showing that the dismissal resulted in actual and substantial prejudice to the litigant.").
Kilpatrick v Texas & PacificRailway, 72 F Supp 635, 638 (S D NY 1947), revd on
other grounds, 166 F2d 788 (2d Cir 1948).
Naartex,722 F2d at 788 n 15.
Wells Fargo,556 F2d at 430-31 n 24.

1999]

JurisdictionalDiscovery

1045

In the context of FSIA claims, however, the court must
evaluate not only the importance of discovery to the plaintiff but
also the unique burdens that discovery may place on foreign sovereigns. 9 While no court has explicitly embraced the use of traditional jurisdictional discovery practices in determining FSIA

claims, ' an understanding of the traditional approach and its
shortcomings is essential to understanding the insufficiency of

the current alternative approaches to jurisdictional discovery under the FSIA.
Traditional permissive approaches to jurisdictional discovery
cannot adequately serve the goals of the FSIA. First, because foreign sovereign immunity guarantees "immunity from suit and not
just from judgement,""° ' broad discovery proceedings may 'Trustrate the significance and benefit of entitlement to immunity
0 2 Rules that permit discovery
from suit.""
whenever "pertinent
facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are in dispute" 3 are
likely to subject states deserving of FSIA protection to burdensome discovery.
Second, traditional approaches to jurisdictional discovery are
inconsistent with the discovery rules governing qualified immunity determinations for public servants. Congress intended to
provide foreign sovereigns with immunity similar to that enjoyed
by U.S. governmental actors." 4 Failure to limit discovery against
"See Part II.C.1.
"In a number of cases, however, courts in the Ninth Circuit have used traditional approaches to jurisdictional discovery in determining claims against foreign sovereigns. See
America West Airlines, Inc v GPA Group, Ltd, 877 F2d 793 (9th Cir 1989); Greenpeace, 946
F Supp 773. In each of these cases the courts espoused traditional notions of jurisdictional
discovery. Nevertheless, in each case the Ninth Circuit refused to allow discovery, albeit
for reasons consistent with even the traditional permissive approach. See America West,
877 F2d at 801 (refusing to permit discovery where: plaintiffs discovery request were
"largely unrelated" to the question of jurisdiction; the defendants had already answered
plaintiff's jurisdictional interrogatories; and plaintiff had failed to request additional discovery until confronted with a motion to dismiss); Greenpeace, 946 F Supp at 789 (refusing
to permit discovery where plaintiff could not show "any possibility that they might demonstrate the requisite jurisdictional facts if afforded the opportunity for additional discovery"). In neither case did the court recognize the need to provide foreign sovereigns with
special protections. The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Phaneufv Republicof Indonesia,
106 F3d 302 (9th Cir 1997), however, suggests that the court may be leaning toward
adopting a heightened standard for discovery against foreign sovereigns. Id at 305-06
(noting that "[i]mmunity under the FSIA is not only immunity from liability, but immunity from suit," but failing to explicate any heightened pleading standard in cases arising
under the Act). Thus, it remains unclear whether the Ninth Circuit continues to adhere to
traditional discovery practices even in the face of foreign sovereign immunity.
"'Segni v Commercial Office of Spain, 816 F2d 344, 346 (7th Cir 1987).
"Gould, 853 F2d at 451.
"America West, 877 F2d at 801.
"See Segni, 816 F2d at 347 (discussing congressional intent to create protections
similar to the qualified immunity of U.S. public officials), citing hearings on HR 11315
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foreign sovereigns is inconsistent with this congressional intent.
In the qualified immunity context, courts have invariably refused
to grant plaintiffs discovery against U.S. government officers absent a substantial showing that such discovery was likely to pro0 5 District courts
duce evidence defeating qualified immunity."
may insist that "the plaintiff put forward specific, nonconclusory
factual allegations' that establish improper motive" before permitting discovery in the qualified immunity context.'e
Similar protection from discovery should be afforded to foreign sovereigns for three reasons. First, the Supreme Court has
explicitly instructed lower courts to exercise special vigilance in
protecting foreign litigants from the undue burdens of international discovery and in respecting "any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state."0 7 Second, in enacting the FSIA, Congress clearly expressed its intent to provide foreign sovereigns
with a level of protection commensurate with that enjoyed by federal and state government officials.0 " Third, although the legislative history of the FSIA illuminates Congress's desire to protect
the litigation interests of U.S. plaintiffs suing foreign sovereigns, °9 the plaintiffs' interests in the FSIA context pale in comparison to the interests at stake in federal civil rights suits-the
vindication of the plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory rights."
(cited in note 61); HR Rep No 94-1487 (cited in note 10); S Rep No 94-1310, 94th Cong, 2d
Sess (1976).
'"See, for example, Blue v Koren, 72 F3d 1075, 1084 (2d Cir 1995); Schultea v Wood,
47 F3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir 1995) (en banc); Veney v Hogan, 70 F3d 917, 922 (6th Cir
1995); Edgington v Missouri Departmentof Corrections,52 F3d 777, 779-80 (8th Cir 1995);
Walter v Morton, 33 F3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir 1994); Oladeinde v City of Birmingham, 963
F2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir 1992); Gooden v Howard County, Maryland, 954 F2d 960, 969-70
(4th Cir 1992); Branch v Tunnell, 937 F2d 1382, 1387-88 (9th Cir 1991); Elliott v Thomas,
937 F2d 338, 344-45 (7th Cir 1991); Colburn v Upper Darby Township, 838 F2d 663, 666
(3d Cir 1988).
' 'Crawford-El v Britton, 523 US 574, 118 S Ct 1584, 1596-97 (1998), quoting Siegert v
Gilley, 500 US 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy concurring).
" See Socitgt Nationale IndustrielleAdrospatiale v United States District Court for the
Southern Districtof Iowa, 482 US 522, 546 (1987) ("American courts, in supervising pretrial proceedings, should exercise special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the
danger that unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in a disadvantageous position.").
'"See Segni, 816 F2d at 347 (discussing congressional intent to create protections
similar to the qualified immunity of U.S. public officials).
' See HR Rep No 94-1487 at 8, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6606-07 (cited in note
10) (noting that the Act makes it easier for U.S. citizens to serve process upon, obtain jurisdiction against, and obtain final relief against foreign states). Compare with id at 45,
reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6634 (purposes of the FSIA are to "facilitate and depoliticize litigation against foreign states and to minimize irritations in foreign relations arising
out of such litigation").
"'See Crawford-El, 118 S Ct at 1593 (noting that qualified immunity of government
officers restricts private damage actions that are often "the only realistic avenue for vindi-
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Finally, the application of traditional jurisdictional discovery
rules in the foreign sovereign immunity context conflicts with the
notion of international comity that underlies foreign sovereign
immunity."1 By failing to consider either the unique burden that
discovery places on foreign defendants, or the risks of abuse and
intrusion that attend any judicial inquiry into the affairs of a foreign state, the traditional approach ignores the principles of
comity and increases the danger that discovery will heighten the
already intense international animosity towards U.S. discovery
practice.'
Such animosity can only hinder American efforts to
encourage foreign sovereigns to "resolve disputes within the
United States' legal framework" 13 and to permit U.S. corporations to enter the previously closed markets of Eastern Europe

and Asia." 4
B.

Heightened Pleading

In contrast to the discretion permitted by the traditional
view, several courts have attempted to define more narrowly the
appropriate grounds for initiating jurisdictional discovery against
a defendant who has asserted a defense of foreign sovereign immunity."5 These courts typically stress the significance of foreign
sovereign immunity and the unique burdens facing a foreign sovereign defendant. Beyond these general principles, however,
courts have offered little uniformity in their discovery standards.
The most widely enunciated standard provides that discovery
must be ordered "circumspectly and only to verify allegations of

cation of constitutional guarantees"), quoting Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 814
(1982).
' See The Schooner Exchange, 11 US (7 Cranch) at 137 (explaining traditional justification for foreign sovereign immunity).
.See Part II.C.1.b.
.Foremost-McKesson,Inc v Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F2d 438, 445 (DCCir 1990),
quoting PracticalConcepts, Inc v Republic of Bolivia, 811 F2d 1543, 1551 n 19 (DCCir
1987).
"'Although permissive discovery rules may decrease the risks that U.S. corporations
face when dealing with foreign governments and their agencies and instrumentalities,
such discovery will also decrease the willingness of foreign governments to deal with U.S.
corporations for fear of exposing themselves to U.S. discovery procedures. Permissive discovery rules have been criticized on a similar basis in the context of qualified immunity.
As Judge Silberman explained in Crawford-El v Britton, "It is perhaps one of the simplest
axioms of law and economics that overdeterrence as well as undeterrence yields inefficient
results." 93 F3d 813, 834 (DC Cir 1996) (Silberman concurring).
' See, for example, Arriba, Ltd v Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F2d 528, 534 (5th Cir
1992); Rafidain Bank, 150 F3d at 176; Millicom InternationalCellular,SA v Republic of
Costa Rica, 1997 US Dist LEXMS 12622, *4 (D DC); Crist v Republic of Turkey, 995 F Supp
5, 12 (D DC 1998); Gabay v Mostazafan Foundationof Iran, 151 FRD 250, 256-57 (S D NY
1993).
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specific facts crucial to an immunity determination." 16 This stan-

dard was initially advanced by the Fifth Circuit in Arriba, Ltd v
Petroleos Mexicanos," 7 which reversed a district court decision
permitting limited jurisdictional discovery where the plaintiff had
alleged jurisdiction under the FSIA's commercial activities exception." The Court of Appeals criticized the district court's reliance
on traditional jurisdictional discovery procedures". and noted the
"tension between permitting discovery to substantiate exceptions
to statutory foreign sovereign immunity and protecting a sovereign's or sovereign agency's legitimate claim to immunity from
discovery.""2 Viewing the potential conflict as similar to the conflicts that frequently arise in connection with domestic government officials' claims of qualified immunity, the Fifth Circuit demanded that district courts more narrowly prescribe jurisdictional discovery against foreign sovereigns.' 2' The court held that
"[a] necessary prerequisite to an order for limited discovery is a
district court's clear understanding of the plaintiffs claims
against a sovereign entity,"'22 and further explained that "discovery may be used to confirm specific facts that have been pleaded
as a basis for enforcing the commercial activities exception, but it
cannot supplant the pleader's duty to state those facts at the outset of the case. " "
In Gabay v Mostazafan Foundation of Iran,'24 the District
Court for the Southern District of New York relied on the Fifth
Circuit's approach, finding that Arriba's threshold requirement
had been met where the plaintiff presented "an array of documents that, taken together," suggested that "admissible evidence
might well be obtained if discovery were permitted."" Furthermore, the court employed a balancing test, noting that because
the plaintiff's discovery requests presented little "risk of significant encroachment on a foreign instrumentality's immunity from
suit," the equities weighed in favor of discovery.'26

""Arriba, 962 F2d at 534.
...
962 F2d 528 (5th Cir 1992).
..Id at 534.

..Id (criticizing the district court for "drawing an analogy to the usual procedure for
resolving contested jurisdictional issues").
"OId.
2 Id ("The potential conflict is not unlike that attendant to claims that challenge domestic government officials' qualified immunity from suit.").
1= Id.
"1Id at 537 n 17.
151 FRD 250 (S D NY 1993).
"'Idat 256-57.
'"Id at 257.
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Since Arriba, courts have articulated a variety of different
standards for determining when to permit jurisdictional discovery
in the FSIA context. The Second Circuit, apparently adopting the
Arriba standard, interpreted the decision as requiring an explicit
balancing test between the plaintiff's need for discovery to "substantiate exceptions to statutory foreign sovereign immunity" and
the need to protect a foreign sovereigns "legitimate claim to immunity from discovery."1" The court demanded that the plaintiffs
show "a reasonable basis for assuming jurisdiction"m before permitting them discovery; the court also insisted that any discovery
be limited. The D.C. Circuit stated simply that "a district court
must proceed with circumspection, lest the evaluation of the

...

immunity itself encroach unduly on the benefits the immunity
was to ensure."'"
In contrast, the D.C. district court has established relatively
sophisticated standards. In Millicom InternationalCellular,SA v
Republic of Costa Rica, 3 ' the court explained that "[i]f plaintiffs
set forth non-conclusory allegations that, if supplemented with
additional evidence, would materially affect the court's analysis
vis-a-vis the FSIA, then the court should permit limited discovery."'32 In Millicom, the court permitted the plaintiff to conduct
discovery regarding the nature of the defendant's commercial relationship with the United States, explaining that "[tihese representations, the nature of which can only be determined through
discovery, may well decide the question of whether the defendant['s] actions . . . creat[ed] a direct effect on the United

States. " " Conversely, in Crist v Republic of Thrkey,"4 the district
court applied the Millicom test and denied discovery where the
plaintiff's allegations constituted nothing more than "conjecture
and surmise"3 ' and where the plaintiffs failed to allege any specific facts supporting their theory of jurisdiction."
'"RafidainBank, 150 F3d at 176, quotingArriba, 962 F2d at 534.
'Rafidain Bank, 150 F3d at 176, quoting Filus v Lot Polish Airlines, 907 F2d 1328,
1332 (2d Cir 1990).
"'RafidainBank, 150 F3d at 176.
'"Papandreou,139 F3d at 253.
1997 US Dist LEXIS 12622 (D DC).

1.1

Id at *4 (The plaintiffs, cellular telephone system operators, alleged that the Republic of Costa Rica and its instrumentalities prevented them from competing in the local
cellular services market and the defendants moved to dismiss on several grounds, including that they were foreign sovereigns under the FSIA.). See also Crist, 995 F Supp at 12,
citing Millicom.
'"1997 US Dist LEXIS 12622 at *24.
"

995 F Supp 5 (D DC 1998).

..Idat 13.
3Id.
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Although courts have articulated nominally different standards for permitting jurisdictional discovery under the FSIA, it is
unclear whether the tests differ fRnctionally. For example, while
the Arriba test calls for "allegations of specific facts crucial to an
immunity determination"3 7 and the Millicom test calls for "nonconclusory allegations" that discovery would "materially affect"
the court's FSIA analysis," it is unlikely that the Arriba court
would permit discovery where it would not "materially affect" the
court's FSIA analysis. Indeed, courts frequently purport to use a
combination of the tests without recognizing any functional differences between them. 39 As one court has noted, "no bright-line
standard exists" for either plaintiffs seeking discovery or defendants seeking to avoid it. 40
Although the heightened pleading standards provide greater
protection than the traditional approach, they still fail to protect
adequately foreign sovereign immunity. Judicial application of
these tests remains largely unpredictable. For example, Arriba's
requirement of "allegations of specific facts"' provides little indication of when a plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to trigger
discovery. Many questions remain for litigants: Are allegations of
specific facts sufficient when those facts would tend to prove the
existence of jurisdiction? Is a plaintiff entitled to discovery when
those allegations materially affect the analysis? Or must a court
deny discovery where a plaintiff has alleged specific facts that are
necessary but insufficient to prove jurisdiction? Arriba and its
progeny leave the answers unclear.
When courts employ balancing tests, even greater confusion
results." Balancing tests rely on ad hoc determinations of the intrusiveness of discovery and considerations of equity; therefore,
they fail to provide parties with predictable standards for when
discovery will be permitted. Indeed, some academics have suggested that balancing tests are predictable only in their tendency
to "balance" in favor of jurisdiction.' As one court explained,
"'Arriba,962 F2d at 534.
""Millicom, 1997 US Dist LEXIS 12622 at *4.
'" See, for example, Crist, 995 F Supp at 12 (citing all three tests as a basis for its conclusion).
140d.
141962 F2d at 534.
"'See, for example, Rafidain Bank, 150 F3d at 176 (noting a "delicate balanc[e]" between the need for discovery and perfection of immunity).
"See Kurt Riechenberg, The Recognition of ForeignPrivileges in United States Discovery Proceedings, 9 Nw J Intl L & Bus 80, 126 (1988) ("The balancing of interests is
nothing but the assertion of the primacy of United States interest in the guise of applying
an international jurisdictional rule of reason."), citing Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing
and ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,31 Am J Comp L 579, 581-82, 588-95 (1983).
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"courts inherently find it difficult neutrally to balance competing
foreign interests. When there is any doubt, national interests will
tend to be favored over foreign interests."'
These tests frustrate the purposes of the FSIA and the general policies underlying foreign sovereign immunity. First, the
unpredictability of judicial discovery standards is plainly inconsistent with Congress's intent to create "firm standards" as to
when a foreign state will be immune from the burdens of litigation.'45 As the Supreme Court has explained, "predictability [is]
essential to any international business transaction." 4 6 Unpredictable discovery standards make it more difficult for U.S. corporations to assess the costs of dealing with foreign entities and decrease the willingness of foreign governments to deal with U.S.
corporations. 47
Second, even the more predictable tests, such as the one espoused in Millicom,48 fail to give foreign sovereigns adequate
protection from intrusive discovery. Because courts have not required plaintiffs to possess actual admissible evidence to demonstrate jurisdiction, plaintiffs are permitted to allege first and
prove second. Often a plaintiff-with no evidentiary basis-may
be able to allege specific facts to demonstrate that discovery
might uncover evidence that will materially affect the court's jurisdictional analysis. For example, in Gabay, the court permitted
limited discovery where the plaintiffs allegations and supporting
documents did not constitute evidence admissible at trial and
were "legally insufficient" to defeat immunity simply because the
allegations suggested that "admissible evidence might well be obtained if discovery were permitted."' As a result, plaintiffs often
may be able to engage in the sort of broad-ranging "fishing expeditions" that FSIA immunity was designed to prevent."5

"Laker Airways Ltd v Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F2d 909, 951 (DCCir
1984).
' HR Rep No 94-1487 at 7,reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6604 (cited in note 10).
'"Scherk v Alberto-Culver Co, 417 US 506, 516 (1974) (discussing predictability in the
context of international arbitration awards).
'"Unpredictable discovery standards raise the transaction costs for both the U.S. corporation, which must weigh the risk that it will be unable to seek judicial relief, and the
foreign entity, which must weigh the risk that it will be forced to comply with costly and
burdensome discovery. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 543 (Little,
Brown 4th ed 1992) (noting that unpredictable rules lead to suboptimal levels of activity
because they raise the risk that permissible activities will be punished and decrease the
certainty that impermissible activities will be punished).
"'See text accompanying note 132.
'"151 FRD at 257.
'See note 64 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, these tests permit plaintiffs to reach discovery
even where discovery is unlikely to produce evidence sufficient to
prove jurisdiction. For example, the Millicom test permits plaintiffs to reach discovery upon a mere showing that discovery will
"materially affect" the court's analysis; 5 ' Arriba permits discovery where it is "crucial to an immunity determination;"' 5 2 and
Gabay permits discovery where "admissible evidence might well
be obtained." 1" Applying these standards, district courts have
frequently permitted discovery only to hold years later that they
never possessed a statutory basis for asserting jurisdiction over
the foreign sovereign.'TM Accordingly, under the heightened
pleading tests, foreign sovereigns will be subjected to discovery
whenever the evidence sought by the plaintiff simply buttresses
his jurisdictional claim-even if that evidence is insufficient to
prove an exception to immunity by a preponderance of the evidence.'
IV.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

Current approaches to jurisdictional discovery under the
FSIA fail to adequately protect foreign sovereigns from the burdens of litigation in U.S. courts. What is needed is an approach
that provides greater protection for foreign sovereigns and
greater certainty for both U.S. and foreign actors.
Rather than permit plaintiffs to obtain discovery where they
have merely advanced allegations that would buttress their
claims, courts should permit limited jurisdictional discovery only
where a plaintiff (1) has produced some admissible evidence of jurisdictional facts and (2) can show that there is a reasonable likelihood that discovery will produce evidence sufficient to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, unlike present formulations that simply require plaintiffs to prove that the
evidence they seek is "essential" or "material," this test would require plaintiffs to prove that the materials they seek are sufficient to defeat a claim of sovereign immunity. Such an approach
1997 US Dist LEXIS 12622 at *4.
..962 F2d at 534.
15

151 FRD at 257.
See, for example, Millicom InternationalCellular,SA v Republic of Costa Rica, 995
F Supp 14 (D DC 1998); Gabay v MostazafanFoundationof Iran, 968 F Supp 895, 900 (S
D NY 1997), affd per curiam, 152 F3d 918 (2d Cir 1998); Filus v Lot PolishAirlines, 939 F
Supp 199 (E D NY 1996), affd per curiam, 133 F3d 169 (2d Cir 1997).
" Courts usually recognize that subject matter jurisdiction must be demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence. See, for example, Stephens v American Home Assurance
Co, 811 F Supp 937, 959 (S D NY 1993) ("It is well established that the [plaintiff] has the
burden of showing that the Court has jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.").
"

15

19991

JurisdictionalDiscovery

1053

would increase the predictability of FSIA determinations and enhance the protections of sovereign immunity while still leaving
the plaintiffs some "space for discovery.""
A.

The Reasonable Likelihood Test

Where the costs of litigation are asymmetrical--either because society values the success of one party more highly than
the other or because the burdens of litigation are unevenly divided-courts and Congress typically attempt to adjust the standard of proof accordingly. 7 For example, courts have consistently
required plaintiffs in corporate derivative suits" and federal civil
rights cases159 to state their claims with particularity before being
permitted discovery.
In the context of foreign sovereign immunity, the costs of litigation argue heavily in favor of restricting plaintiffs' access to
discovery. Discovery is likely to require defendants to submit to
lengthy and expensive production of evidence, as well as impose
political burdens on foreign actors." Plaintiffs, on the other
hand, bear no similar litigation costs.' 6 ' Furthermore, while the
United States has a strong interest in protecting its citizens and
businesses in their dealings with foreign actors,'62 it has an
equally strong, if not stronger, interest in guaranteeing the sovereign immunity of foreign states." As discussed in Part H, permissive discovery rules threaten to impair America's political and
economic relations with foreign states; discourage foreign entities
from trading with American corporations and resolving their disputes within the United States' legal framework; and may encourage foreign governments to modify their own discovery and
immunity laws in a manner hostile to U.S. political, economic,
and military interests.
'Crawford-El u Britton, 93 F3d 813, 841 (DC Cir 1996) (Ginsburg concurring) (discussing the benefits of a similar rule in the context of qualified immunity cases), revd, 523
US 574 (1998).
"See Crawford-El, 93 F3d at 822 (plurality opinion) (describing asymmetrical costs
and adjustments in the burden of proof in a variety of cases).
'See, for example, Joy u North, 692 F2d 880, 889 (2d Cir 1982) (discussing early application of business judgment rule in response to claim of demand futility); Zitin u Turley,
1991 US Dist LEXIS 10084, *5-10 (D Ariz) (same).
See note 105 and accompanying text.
"See Part u.C.I.a.
"'Plaintiffs, of course, might face additional costs if they are unable to litigate their
claims.
"' See HR Rep No 94-1487 at 1-9, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6604-08 (cited in note
10) (arguing that U.S. citizens need greater access to courts in suits against foreign
states).
' See Part HI.C.1.
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In dealing with similar asymmetries in the context of qualified immunity, Judge Douglas Ginsburg has suggested that a
plaintiff should be allowed to "pursue limited discovery only upon
a showing that he has a reasonable likelihood of turning up evidence" that would meet his evidentiary burden.' The U.S. Solicitor General has advocated a similar rule, with the added requirement that a plaintiff produce "some evidence" before being
permitted discovery.' The Solicitor General's proposed rule for
qualified immunity can be applied in the sovereign immunity
context, providing the optimal limitations on discovery against
foreign sovereigns.
Although the Supreme Court apparently rejected these
heightened discovery requirements in the context of qualified
immunity in Crawford-El v Britton,1" these standards provide a
useful alternative to current limitations on discovery in the context of foreign sovereign immunity and pose none of the constitutional problems that led the Court to reject them in the qualified
immunity context.
Most FSIA cases stand in sharp contrast to the typical federal civil rights suit. In contrast to the commercial nature of most
FSIA suits, qualified immunity generally protects government officials from liability in suits arising from constitutional harm."
In Crawford-El, the Supreme Court was driven by concerns about
the importance of civil rights suits and the lack of alternative
forms of redress for constitutional wrongs. !' For example, in
Crawford-El the Court noted that there are few checks on the behavior of state government officials outside of Section 1983
suits. 169

These concerns are largely absent in the FSIA context. In the
realm of international commerce a number of extrajudicial factors

'"Crawford-El,93 F3d at 841 (Ginsburg concurring).
"Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in support of Respondent, Crawford-El
v Britton, 523 US 574 (1998), available at 1997 WL 606738, *26, citing Elliot v Thomas,
937 F2d 338, 345 (7th Cir 1991).
" 523 US 574, 118 S Ct 1584, 1596-98 (1998). Although the Supreme Court did not
explicitly reject Judge Ginsburg's discovery formulation, the Court's dicta strongly suggests that such an approach is impermissible in the context of qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity protects government officials from suits alleging violations of
constitutional or statutory rights. See Ross, ed, Sword & Shield at 532 (cited in note 63).
118 S Ct at 1593 ("In Harlow ... [w]e further emphasized: 'In situations of abuse of
office, an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees."'), quoting Harlow v Fitzgerald,457 US 800,814 (1982).
1-Crawford-El, 118 S Ct at 1593 (describing Section 1983 lawsuits as "'the only realistic' remedy for the violation of constitutional guaranteesr). Compare this discussion with
Judge Silberman's concurrence in Crawford-El, 93 F3d at 836-37 (discussing the various
statutory, reputational, and theological restraints on the actions of government officials).
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operate to constrain the behavior of foreign state actors. For example, foreign actors must worry about acting in a manner that
will hurt their commercial reputation, expose them to liability in
their own courts, or persuade the U.S. State Department or U.S.
Trade Representative to take action against them. 170 While the
threats of diplomatic and economic pressure or reputational loss
may not always be sufficient to constrain the behavior of foreign
actors, the vast majority of FSIA plaintiffs possess far greater
political and economic power than the run-of-the-mill Section
1983 plaintiff-prisoners. 7 ' Accordingly, the need for judicial intervention is diminished in the context of FSIA suits. Moreover,
the Supreme Court has suggested that courts must "exercise special vigilance" in protecting foreign actors from the burdens of
discovery.172 Thus, it is unlikely that the Court will find that a
plaintiff's right to conduct discovery against a foreign sovereign
merits the same level of protection as a plaintiff's right to vindicate his civil rights against a domestic government official.
B. The Reasonable Likelihood Test Adequately Protects
Foreign Sovereign Defendants
The reasonable likelihood test decreases the burden on foreign sovereign defendants in two ways. First, the requirement of
"some evidence" forces plaintiffs to make a substantial threshold
17

The U.S. Trade Representative ("USTRW) frequently intervenes on behalf of U.S.
corporations engaged in international commercial disputes. See, for example, US Farmers
Vent Fury at Finnish Barley Shipment, European Rep (May 30, 1998) (USTR subsidizing
American barley exports in response to Finnish corporation's exports to the United States
of subsidized barley); Ruth Walker, Canada'sDry on Exporting Water, Christian Sci Mon
6 (June 15, 1998) (USTR intervening in dispute between U.S. entrepreneur and Canadian
government regarding bulk water exports); Errol Oh, ChippingAway at Piracy,Malaysian
Bus 20, 1998 WL 9225595 (June 1, 1998) (USTR involvement in overseas software piracy
on behalf of US corporations). The State Department also frequently intervenes in commercial litigation. See, for example, In re Papandreou,139 F3d 247, 252 (DC Cir 1998)
(State Department intervening to assert an interest in the "senstive diplomatic considerations involved"); David Usborne, Swiss Banks Furious at U.S. Boycott Threats, The Independent 17 (July 3, 1998) (State Department intervening to resolve California and New
York boycott of Swiss banks over unreturned Nazi gold). Furthermore, the State Department frequently intervenes to resolve matters relevant to the recently enacted extrajudicial killings and torture provisions of the FSIA. See, for example, David Scheffer, Human
Rights and InternationalJustice, US Dept State Dispatch 25, 1998 WL 12885578 (Nov 1,
1998) (discussing use of diplomatic pressure against alleged war criminals).
...
In 1988, prisoner lawsuits accounted for over half of the 40,000 federal civil rights
actions filed against government officials. See Crawford-El, 93 F3d at 830 (Silberman concurring). In 1993, prisoners alone filed 39,933 civil rights petitions. See Jody L. Sturtz, A
Prisoner'sPrivilege to File in Forma PauperisProceedings: May It Be Numerically Restricted, 1995 Det Coll L L Rev 1349, 1371 n 172.
"'Socisal Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v United States District Court for the
Southern Districtof Iowa, 482 US 522, 546 (1987).
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showing of jurisdictional facts. Plaintiffs need not produce evidence that by itself would support a finding of jurisdiction, but
they must demonstrate that some such evidence exists. This requirement prevents plaintiffs from simply alleging in detail facts
that they only guess to be true. Plaintiffs must "have a concrete
basis for believing that discovery will uncover the necessary evidence." 73
For example, both Arriba and Millicom would permit discovery based on a hypothetical complaint alleging that the Central
Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran was at all times engaged in
commercial activity in the U.S. through its alter-ego, "The Money
Store." Specifically, Iran's Ministry of Finance engaged in daily
teleconferences with The Money Store's corporate leadership and
directed their corporate activity. The proposed test, however,
would deny discovery unless the plaintiff could produce some admissible evidence of the alleged alter-ego relationship, such as
phone logs or affidavits from disgruntled Money Store employees.
Thus, the rule precludes plaintiffs from engaging in (even limited) fishing expeditions unless they have some evidence of a basis for jurisdiction. 74
Second, courts can further protect foreign sovereigns by insisting that plaintiffs demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that
discovery will uncover evidence sufficient to prove jurisdiction by
a preponderance of the evidence. Unlike current formulations, the
reasonable likelihood test requires plaintiffs to do more than just
demonstrate that discovery will buttress their claims: it requires
them to show that such discovery will be sufficient to uphold a
finding of jurisdiction. Thus, the rule precludes even productive
discovery where the evidence likely to be discovered cannot prove
jurisdiction beyond a preponderance of the evidence.
Some have questioned the ability of lower court judges to apply uniformly a rule that depends so heavily on ex ante calculations of litigation success. Judge Silberman of the D.C. Circuit
criticized the reasonable likelihood test in the context of qualified
immunity claims, arguing that district courts would be unable to
apply an ex ante test consistently, undermining the predictability
of the law and inducing '"more paralysis than discouragement of
wicked actions." 75 Such criticism underestimates the ability of
'"Brief for the United States, 1997 WL 606738 at *27 (cited in note 165).
..'The Supreme Court has upheld a similar rule in the context of selective prosecution
claims. See United States v Armstrong, 517 US 456, 468-69 (1996). In Armstrong, the
Court concluded that the public's interest in protecting prosecutors from burdensome discovery justified such a heightened standard. Id.
'Crawford-El, 93 F3d at 834 (Silberman concurring).
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lower courts to make ex ante determinations of litigation outcomes. In contrast to the judiciary's inherent difficulties in balancing foreign interests, 76 U.S. courts are well-suited to determine the likelihood of success on the merits.
District court judges presently make similar ex ante determinations in a wide variety of contexts. When a district court
rules on a motion for a preliminary injunction, it must determine
whether the party seeking the injunction is likely to succeed on
the merits. 17 Courts conduct the same inquiry when determining
whether to designate counsel to represent an indigent plaintiff in
civil rights litigation. 7 8 Similarly, in determining whether to
permit discovery in shareholder derivative suits, courts are forced
to evaluate the merits of the plaintiff's substantive claims at an
early stage of litigation. 7 9 The last example is most analogous to
foreign sovereign immunity, since failure to get discovery in a derivative suit would, in most cases, end the litigation entirely.
Any forward-looking test will invariably result in some uncertainty. Nevertheless, a test that permits judges to determine
the likely efficacy of discovery provides greater certainty than the
traditional approaches, which permit unfettered discretion; or
balancing approaches, which force courts to act beyond their institutional competence. Courts are institutionally well-suited to
making predictions about litigation success and litigants are accustomed to making such predictions; because both courts and
litigants are well-versed in such predictions, uncertainty is
minimized. Neither courts nor litigants, however, are institutionally adept at balancing the competing interests of foreign sovereign immunity against the need to assert jurisdiction. And, much
like the situation posed by pre-FSIA State Department determinations of immunity, "considerable uncertainty results.""
In addition, present formulations, which simply require "allegations of specific facts" or allegations that will "materially affect" the analysis, engender similar uncertainties. Litigants can-

"See Part III.B.
,7See, for example, Benten v Kessler, 505 US 1084, 1085 (1992) (per curiam) (rejecting
preliminary injunction for failure to demonstrate "a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits"); Hoover u Morales, 1998 US App LEXIS 32611, *3 (5th Cir) (same); Associated
General ContractorsofAmerica v Metropolitan Water District of Southern California,159
F3d 1178, 1180-81 (9th Cir 1998) (rejecting preliminary injunction for failure to demon-

strate likelihood ofsuccess on the merits).
""See, for example, Wilborn v Escalderon, 789 F2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir 1986) (stating
that in forma pauperis is an extraordinary remedy that requires an evaluation of the
"likelihood of success on the merits").
,' See cases cited in note 158.
""HR Rep No 94-1487 at 9, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6607 (cited in note 10).
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not accurately predict the likelihood that a discovery request will
succeed or fail where success hinges simply on a vague judicial
determination that the request is material. As discussed in Part
III.B, these formulations leave a number of questions unanswered for litigants. In contrast, the proposed formulation would
permit district courts to utilize their institutional competence and
simply predict whether the evidence sought will be sufficient to
defeat defendants' claims of immunity.
C. The Reasonable Likelihood Test Permits Plaintiffs Adequate
Jurisdictional Discovery
Although the reasonable likelihood test makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to reach discovery, it still provides sufficient
room for meritorious claims. Though the plaintiffs must present
some evidence of jurisdiction, that evidence need not be sufficient
to prove jurisdiction by itself. In the typical FSIA case involving a
commercial activities exception to immunity, the plaintiff is likely
to possess some evidence that the defendant engaged in commercial activities in the United States. For example, the prototypical
commercial activities exception cases involve contract disputes; 8 '
in these cases, plaintiffs will presumably possess some evidence
demonstrating a commercial relationship. Moreover, plaintiffs
will frequently be able to offer their own affidavits as evidence of
the defendants' commercial activities or tortious acts. 82 Where
plaintiffs can demonstrate that discovery is likely to be not only
fruitful but also persuasive, this rule will not preclude discovery.
True, sometimes plaintiffs will be denied discovery and will consequently be unable to sustain jurisdiction, but these are the
costs of immunity.
CONCLUSION

Judicial treatment of jurisdictional discovery under the FSIA
has been inconsistent. While courts have articulated a number of
different standards for limiting such discovery, current efforts
uniformly fail to accord proper respect to the sovereignty of foreign states. This failure threatens to undermine international
.1.See Texas Trading & Milling Corp FederalRepublic of Nigeria, 647 F2d 300, 307-10
(2d Cir 1981) (discussing FSIA's treatment of contract as prototype of "commercial activ-

ity').
" Outside of the alter-ego context, plaintiffs will often be able to testify personally. For
example, in Greenpeace, 946 F Supp at 786-87, plaintiffs were able to attest personally to
the tortious acts but were simply unable to attest to the alter-ego relationship. Ultimately,
however, proving alter-ego liability is likely to be difficult under any standard.

19991

JurisdictionalDiscovery

1059

comity. International comity enhances foreign states' willingness
to transact with U.S. corporations, secures similar protections for
the U.S. government, and generates greater acceptance of U.S.
discovery practices. Courts should attempt to define more clearly
the limits of jurisdictional discovery and to strike a balance between foreign sovereign immunity and the interests of plaintiffs
in adjudicating claims. In place of current limitations, courts
should predicate discovery upon a showing that the plaintiff is
reasonably likely to prove jurisdiction beyond a preponderance of
the evidence and should accordingly require plaintiffs to present
some admissible evidence of jurisdiction prior to discovery. This
approach better protects foreign sovereigns from unwarranted
discovery and accords more closely with international notions of
comity, yet still affords plaintiffs adequate opportunity to pursue
legitimate discovery.

